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Introduction
The subjective expectation about the length of ones' life is an important parameter when analyzing saving behavior (see, e.g., Hamermesh (1985) ), because, e.g., the length of time for which an annuity is expected to be received has an immediate impact on the value of the savings or investment plan. The markets for private annuities received growing attention in recent years because of an increase in private retirement savings and the need to spread the pay-outs over the retirement period. Due to demographic change pension systems around the world underwent substantial reforms. Frequently these reforms caused a shift in responsibility for retirement income from the state towards the individual level.
Therefore, individuals do not only face the challenge of deciding about the accumulation of assets during working life but also the decumulation of assets during retirement. Most of the research on households' behavior so far has focused on the accumulation of assets.
The contribution of this paper is to make some inferences about how households deal with the decumulation of assets and in particular how annuity choice is influenced by subjective survival expectations.
In his seminal contribution Yaari (1965) showed that for individuals with uncertain life time and no bequest motive it is optimal to annuitize all wealth if the annuity market is actuarially fair. Annuities are life-long payment streams which insure against longevity risk, i.e. the risk of outliving ones assets. Following up on Yaari's contribution Brown (2001) finds that indeed US households with higher annuity equivalent wealth are more likely to annuitize, however he also finds a substantial fraction of unexplained heterogeneity in annuity demand. Research on the structure of the markets for private annuities finds that these markets are underdeveloped in many developed economies (see, e.g., Friedman and Warshawsky (1990) , Mitchell et al. (1999), v. Gaudecker and Weber (2004) ). Common explanations for households' reluctance to annuitize their wealth are bequest motives, income from social security which is already paid as an annuity, precautionary savings, pooling of risks within the family, and behavioral responses.
1 One widely accepted explanation for the small size of annuity markets is market failure due to information asymmetries. More specifically, in the case of private annuities individuals have better knowledge of their own longevity risk than the insurer and "when observationally identical individuals are offered a choice from the same menu of insurance contracts, higher-risk individuals will buy more insurance" (Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) , p.187).
As a consequence those with high life expectancy will buy insurance whereas those with low risk of a long life will stay out of the market. This will result in increasing insurance premiums and in the extreme case the markets will fail due to adverse selection (Akerlof (1970) ). One crucial element in this argument is that individuals are well informed about their longevity risk.
The objective of this paper is to shed light onto the market for private annuities from In their seminal contribution Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) point out that adverse selection in the market for long-term care insurance is related to individuals' perceived risk of needing long-term care in the future. In our data we have very specific information on the individuals, including their subjective life expectancy. This gives us the unique opportunity to test for asymmetric information ex ante, i.e. before the "risk" materializes.
One of the reasons why it is particularly interesting to study the behavior of German households lies in a special feature of the German annuity market. In Germany the need to accumulate private retirement savings for many households became apparent after the 2001 pension reform. In the reform it was not only decided to reduce pension income from the public system substantially for future generations but also to introduce state subsidies if individuals accumulate assets in certain private pension contracts-so called Riester pensions. Riester pensions are voluntary private pensions. Individuals contribute 4% of their gross income annually to receive a yearly lump sum subsidy of 154 Euros plus 185 Euros for each child born before 2008 and 300 Euros for those born after or a tax refund-which ever is larger. One special feature of these savings contracts is that at least 70% of the accumulated assets have to be converted into a lifelong payment stream;
a maximum of 30% can be received as a lump sum. Payment streams cannot decrease over time.
2 This feature of Riester pensions makes them interesting to study from our point of view, because the savings and annuitization decision are taken jointly at the point in time when the contract is bought.
3 2 For more information see, e.g., v. Gaudecker and Weber (2006) , Coppola and Reil-Held (2009) , Coppola and Gasche (2011) , Börsch-Supan and Gasche (2010a) , Pfarr and Schneider (2011) .
3 I.e., only the decision how to invest 30% of the accumulated assets is taken at the point of retirement.
In this context we examine the relationship between subjective life expectancy and the demand for Riester annuities. More specifically we test the hypothesis that individuals with higher subjective life expectancy might be more inclined to buy Riester pensions.
At the same time, government subsidies encourage individuals with high subsidy rates to buy annuities. Nevertheless, due to the voluntary nature of the Riester pensions we still expect a selection effect. There is an additional twist with respect to the Riester pensions as insurance companies are only allowed to offer so-called unisex tariffs, i.e. they are not allowed to calculate the pension payments using gender specific life expectancies. As women have on average higher life expectancy this makes Riester pensions less attractive for men. Therefore a Riester pension seems particular desirable for women because they benefit from the subsidies as well as from the underlying unisex life expectancy. For men the picture is less clear, the attractiveness of Riester pensions relative to an unsubsidized contract depends on the relative advantage of the subsidy and the disadvantage due to the unisex tariffs-the overall effect is unclear. Due to these differences we test our hypothesis separately for men and women.
After introducing the institutional context in Section 2 and developing our hypotheses in Section 3 our paper proceeds in three steps. First we examine the quality of subjective life expectancy data of our sample by comparing it to the official life tables and by linking it to individual risk factors and socioeconomic characteristics (Section 4). Second we test for selection in subjective life expectancy on the Riester market in a simple probit model (Section 5). Finally we compare the difference in mortality tables for the private annuity market as calculated by the German actuary association (DAV) and the official life tables for Germany to the spread on the Riester market that we detect in peoples' subjective life expectancy (Section 6). The motivation here is to estimate to what extent the loading charge of the annuity industry is justified compared to individual behavior. In section 7
we discuss our results and provide some robustness checks before concluding with some policy implications in Section 8.
Our main result are the following: Men and women substantially underestimate their longevity risk. On average women expect to live about 7 and men expect to live about 6.5 years shorter compared to the official life tables for Germany. Second, for women we find a small selection effect in the German market for Riester annuities based on their subjective life expectancy. Women who expect to live longer are more likely to hold a Riester pension. However for men, we do not find evidence for a selection effect on the Riester market. This could be driven by the presence of unisex tariffs on the market for Riester contracts that lead to disproportionately high loading charges for men compared to women. Finally, we calculate the loading charges of the insurance industry by comparing the official life tables for Germany and the records of the German actuary association (DAV). Comparing the loading charges with the differences in subjective life expectancy for individuals with and without Riester pensions shows the following picture:
for women the average difference of between 1 and 2 years in life expectancy appears to be in line with the mark up charged by the industry. However, for men the insurance industry seems to overcompensate the selection effect by far. While we find no selection effect based on subjective life expectancy the mark up by the industry ranges between 7
and 8 years discouraging men to invest in such contracts.
Institutional Context
In the course of the German public pension reforms the standard pension level was decided to be reduced in order to avoid dramatic increases in contribution rates. Börsch-Supan Evaluations of micro-data show that Riester contracts are popular among women and individuals living in east Germany. The coverage among individuals at the bottom of the income distribution is still relatively low, but reveals a high dynamic (see Reil-Held (2009) and Geyer and Steiner (2009) ). Generally, even nine years after the introduction, a vivid debate still rages about the effectiveness of Riester pensions, their distributional and macroeconomic effects. 
Literature and Hypotheses
There are two general problems in insurance markets related to asymmetric information: adverse selection and moral hazard. Empirically it is very hard or even impossible to 7 See, e.g., Sommer (2007) , Fassauer and Toutaoui (2009) . 8 For further details on the structure of the subsidies, eligibility rules and the dynamics of the Riester plans see, e.g., Börsch-Supan et al. (2008) , Reil-Held (2009) and Sommer (2007) .
9 See, e.g., Börsch-Supan et al. (2010) , Börsch-Supan and Gasche (2010b,a) , Reil-Held (2009), Corneo et al. (2009) , Gasche and Ziegelmeyer (2010) , Pfarr and Schneider (2011), Sommer (2007) . differentiate the two (see Chiappori and Salanie (2000) ). However, it is widely agreed that moral hazard, i.e. changes in behavior because of insurance uptake, is not a major problem in the market for private annuities while the problem of adverse selection is present (see, e.g., Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) ). Individuals who want to insure against longevity risk by buying an annuity have better knowledge of their own longevity risk than the insurer. They might have private information on their own health and life-style or the longevity of relatives. Thus, especially individuals with a high risk of living a long life have an incentive to buy insurance. Empirical evidence of adverse selection in the market for life-annuities is, for example, provided by Mitchell et al. (1999) for the United States, by Poterba (2002, 2004) and Rothschild (2009) for the United Kingdom, and by v. Gaudecker and Weber (2004) for Germany.
In order to determine the value of any given annuity the calculation of the money's worth ratio (MWR) has proven to be a useful concept (Mitchell et al. (1999) ). The MWR is the expected benefit of an annuity divided by the expected premium to be paid. In order to derive our hypotheses we use the MWR developed by Mitchell et al. and make some adjustments to take account of the Riester subsidies. Thus, we define the MWR of an annuity from the perspective of individual j in the following way:
where T R is the time of retirement entry, i t is the interest rate at time t. Individual j pays contributions Z jt per period during the accumulation phase which are comprised of own contributions plus subsidies and receives payment A t per period during the decumulation phase. p jt is the survival probability of individual j until t. Actuarially fair annuities have a MWR equal to one. Administrative cost, taxes and adverse selection can cause MWRs below one. However, it can still be attractive to buy an annuity with a value below one if individuals are risk averse and face life time uncertainty (Mitchell et al. (1999) ).
In general, the probability to own an annuity increases if the MWR increases. From an individual perspective the MWR of a given annuity with a given price increases with an increase in the number of periods for which the payment A t is received, i. We propose that conditional on all the characteristics of the individual that the insurers (can) use to set the price (i.e. age) we expect individuals with higher life expectancy to be more likely to own Riester contracts.
We test this hypothesis separately for men and women, because mandatory unisex tariffs change the demand structure for Riester pensions depending on gender as men have lower average life expectancy compared to women. V. Gaudecker and Weber (2006) predict a large efficiency loss for men based on this policy; they find that this reform lowered payouts for men by about 7 percent while changing almost nothing for women.
Based on this they expect men to buy more traditional annuity contracts that are still offering gender specific rates and not opt for Riester pensions. The overall effect is hard to predict, because it depends on the relative size of the subsidy-effect (which encourages individuals to buy Riester pensions compared to non subsidized contracts) and the unisex tariffs encouraging only men with very high subjective life expectancy to buy Riester contracts. As a result conditional on the subsidies the difference in life expectancy between individuals with a Riester and without an annuity contract should be even more pronounced for men than for women.
As participation in private pensions is voluntary in Germany and in our population data set we do not have information on the specific contract details we focus on reactions at the extensive margin.
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One potential problem of our test for adverse selection is that individual preferences which are simultaneously related to mortality expectations and pension ownership and which are unknown to the insurer might have an effect on the market equilibrium. For example risk preferences might have a positive effect on longevity and on annuity ownership because risk averse individuals both live longer and buy insurance. Furthermore, wealthier individuals are more inclined to buy annuities and at the same time there is a well established link between life expectancy and wealth (see, e.g. Attanasio and Hoynes (2000)). Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) term this kind of selection "passive selection" as opposed to "active selection" where the annuity is purchased due to private information on mortality. We try to tackle this problem by providing regression analyses where we control for a large set of individual preference parameters and socioeconomic controls.
From the perspective of the insurer it does not matter whether households select coverage on the basis of wealth and thus have higher life expectancy due to that or whether they select on the basis of better subjective information on life expectancy. Even though active and passive selection can have similar effects on welfare (Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) ) they might lead to rather different policy conclusions.
The Data
We make use of the waves 2007-2009 of the German SAVE panel collected by the Munich
Center for the Economics of Aging. 11 The SAVE survey is a representative longitudinal study of German households' financial behavior, with a specific focus on saving and oldage provisions. Our main sample contains 3,676 observations of non-retired respondents between age 26 and 60 who are eligible for a Riester contract. Riester eligibility is determined by employment status and marital status. Every individual contributing to the German public pension system and the spouses of these persons are eligible for Riester subsidies.
12 As the complete SAVE panel is representative for households in Germany, our reduced sample should be representative for those German households eligible for a Riester pension. We find an almost equal share of male (49.0%) and female (51.0%)
participants. For our analysis we use information regarding individual subjective life expectancy, individual old age provision as well as socio-demographic characteristics.
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More details about these variables are provided below.
Subjective Life Expectancy
Our central variable of interest is subjective life expectancy (SLE). In contrast to previous work individuals are not asked for survival probabilities (as for example in similar work by McGarry (1995, 2002) , Teppa (2011) ) but rather for the age that they expect to reach. The survey question proceeds in three steps. First, participants have to state their belief about the average life expectancy of their cohort. Second, they are asked if they believe their life will be shorter, as long as or longer compared to their cohort. After that respondents have to express their relative life expectancy in years. The wording of the questions is as follows:
• What do you think, which age will men/women of your age reach on average?
(answer expressed in years)
• We label the results from the first question subjective cohort life expectancy. The second question gives the subjective relative life expectancy (RLE). We can calculate subjective absolute life expectancy by adding the respondents' subjective cohort life expectancy and their subjective relative life expectancy.
14 Table 2 summarizes the answers given to the questions above and subjective life expectancy calculated from the answers separately for men and women. 15 Apart from our main sample consisting only of individuals that are eligible for a Riester contract we made the same calculations for a larger sample that includes all non-retired respondents between 26 and 60. Furthermore the table shows the corresponding age-weighted statistical life expectancies separately for the period and cohort life tables of the federal statistics office.
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[ Table 2 about here]
Before adding subjective cohort life expectancy and relative life expectancy to obtain SLE we would like to take a closer look at RLE. For this measure each respondent has to make a comparison between his subjective cohort and his personal life expectancy.
In a representative sample like SAVE the positive and negative deviations should cancel each other out, so we would expect a mean relative life expectancy equal to zero for the 14 Strictly speaking respondents are not asked for subjective life expectancy but for age at death. If it is equally likely that respondents die aged x + 1 month compared to age x + 11 months age at death should be about half a year shorter than SLE. However, as respondents might also round their responses to the nearest full age the answers are still likely to reflect SLE and not age at death.
15 For a similar analysis based on earlier waves of SAVE see Börsch-Supan and Essig (2005) . 16 The values of the period and cohort life tables of the Statistische Bundesamt are weighted with the age distribution of each sample to make values comparable.
population as a whole. Surprisingly, the SAVE data shows a prevailing pessimism among men and women, meaning that the respondents on average believe they will live a shorter life than their cohorts.
18 The results are in line with previous findings of Börsch-Supan by ?, describing the use of readily available data to form an expectation. On the other hand respondents might have a better grasp of their own longevity than the forecasts in 18 We apply a t-test to see whether RLE significantly differs from zero and find significant differences.
19 Even if we miss-interpret our variable and respondents really stated age at death in stead of SLE a difference of 6.5 (6) years for women (men) with respect to the statistical life tables occurs. the official records. Perozek (2008) shows for a sample of older US respondents in 1992 that based on their predictions of longevity the unusual revision of the gender specific life tables by the US Social Security Actuary (SSA) between 1992 and 2004 could have been foreseen.
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Another noteworthy point is that the standard deviations of the SLE measure appear rather high with values around 8 years. However, if we compare those values with the standard deviation of observed life expectancy, which can take values of around 7 years (see, e.g., Fries (1980) ), our estimates seem to match the statistical distribution fairly well. Intuitively the high standard deviation simply reflects that individuals die at very different ages due to personal circumstances like, e.g., differences in health status, health behavior and genetic makeup.
Previous research has shown that measures of SLE seem to convey meaningful information on true mortality (see, e.g., results by Hamermesh (1985) , McGarry (1995, 2002) , Smith et al. (2001) ). Subjective life expectancy is related to subjective and objective health status and risk factors such as smoking or early death of relatives (see, e.g., Hamermesh (1985) , Hurd and McGarry (1995) ). Furthermore, Hurd and McGarry (2002) and Smith et al. (2001) show, that subjective survival probabilities of Health and Retirement Study respondents predict actual survival. Those respondents surviving between waves predicted significantly higher survival in wave 1 compared to those who died between waves. Additionally they find that survival probabilities are adjusted when a parent dies and are updated with changes in health status. As previous studies on subjective life expectancy are mainly based on older US households in the following we present some evidence on the associations between subjective life expectancy, socio-demographic characteristics, and risk factors for our sample.
In table 3 we present results of linear regressions with subjective life expectancy as dependent variable. Individuals realize the gender gap in life expectancy, women believe to live about 5 years longer than men. Subjective life expectancy declines with age and is lower for respondents with lower levels of education as long as we do not control for differences in subjective and objective health status. When we take account of differences in health status the age and education effects disappear: Having good or very good subjective health status is positively associated with long life expectancy and having a serious health condition such as a heart attack, cancer or other problems is negatively related to subjective life expectancy. Smokers expect to live about 2.5 years shorter. results from previous studies that respondents seem to have a meaningful picture of their own mortality risk relative to each other.
[ Table 3 about here]
Private Pensions
The SAVE questionnaire also includes information about individual old age provision.
We know the number of Riester contracts per household. The underlying assumption of our analysis is that a respondent possesses a Riester contract if the number of contracts is larger than zero.
21 The SAVE data contains the information whether or not people possess a contract in each year. We can see a positive dynamic in the distribution of
Riester contracts starting with a coverage rate of 32% in 2007 reaching almost 40% in
2009.
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Subjective Life Expectancy and Pension Choice
In order to quantify a selection effect depending on SLE we divide our sample first by gender and additionally into two subgroups according to pension ownership. The first group is our reference group and consists of those individuals who neither possess a Riester contract nor any other private old age provision. The second group contains all individuals holding a Riester contract. Note that because we want to evaluate the Riester market as a whole, it does not matter whether people in group two hold a Riester contract exclusively or if they also own other forms of old age provision. Comparing the second group with the reference group should reveal the selection effect present on the Riester market. It is important to understand, that individuals who hold a private annuity contract but not a Riester contract are not part of our reference group because these people still take part in the annuity market as a whole and therefore make up the population for which special life tables are applied.
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We start our overview by concentrating on the hypotheses presented in section 3. We expect to observe a higher subjective life expectancy for both women and men with a
Riester contract compared to the respective reference group without any annuity contract. Table 4 shows the descriptive results for our four subgroups in terms of their mean 21 In the case that we observe less contracts than eligible household members the respondent does not necessarily possess a Riester contract. We address this problem in the robustness checks.
22 For more information on the dynamics and determinants of Riester contract uptake see, e.g., Coppola and Reil-Held (2009) .
23 See also section 6.
absolute and relative subjective life expectancy. Comparing the mean absolute subjective life expectancy of individuals with a Riester contract to those with no private pension we find a significant difference for men and women. Women with a Riester pension expect to live about 1.6 years longer (significant at 1%) compared to those without any private provisions. And men with a Riester contract expect to live about 0.9 years longer (significant at 5%) compared to those without a contract.
Taking a closer look at the RLE measure again shows an overall pessimism, meaning that regardless of peoples' annuity choices on average the respondents believe they will live a shorter life than their respective cohorts. One important consequence of pessimism about ones life expectancy is that those individuals might save too little for retirement.
Thus, if individuals are badly informed about their own longevity risk this can be a market barrier with regard to demand. Comparing groups with Riester pensions to those without a private pension we find a slightly more pessimistic view of individuals without an annuity contract compared to those with an annuity contract.
[ Table 4 about here]
However, the comparison thus far does not correct for a different age composition of the households. In the case of the female respondents those without any annuity happen to be on average 3.45 years older than those with a subsidized Riester contract.
In the male population those with no annuity contract are 1.55 years older compared to the Riester savers. Thus the difference in absolute life expectancy could be solely explained by this age gap. Therefore, the main question remains whether we can detect a selection effect in life expectancy on the market for Riester annuities conditioning on all characteristics that the providers can use to set their prize, i.e. age. In other words, if we can find adverse selection in the sense of an information asymmetry. In order to shed some light on this question we apply a simple probit model. In the model we use a binary dependent variable that takes the value one if there is a least one Riester contract in the household and zero otherwise. We first start with a model that uses subjective life expectancy, birth year and age as the only explanatory variables. This represents the perspective of the insurance industry in the sense that it is not a question of causality but simply a test whether or not the population of uninsured people differs from the one with an annuity contract in terms of their subjective life expectancy after controlling for birth year and age as the only relevant variables in terms of pricing. Next, based on the idea of Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) , we want to disentangle whether people actively select themselves into annuity contracts based on private information about their life expectancy or if other covariates which correlate with life expectancy drive the decision. For example people with a higher income might be more likely to purchase an annuity contract and high income individuals happen to have a higher life expectancy. Therefore, more covariates are added to the model to get a better understanding of whether subjective life expectancy remains significant after controlling for all relevant aspects. All analyses are conducted separately by gender because our previous considerations in section 3 regarding unisex tariffs and mark ups suggest a different influence of the covariates depending on the respondents' gender. Table 5 and 6 show the results respectively for women and men.
[ Tables 5 and 6 about here]
The first specification for the female respondents in In other words, a 40-year-old born in 1960 is more likely to hold a contract compared to a 40-year-old born in 1950. As a first result the standard test for adverse selection in model (1) reveals an effect of subjective life expectancy for women but not for men.
This comes with some surprise considering our initial considerations where we expected an effect for women as well as men, with an even larger effect for men.
Next we look at specification (2) to (4) where we add more covariates to our model.
The objective is to differentiate between active and passive selection as the two would have very different policy implications. In the models (2) and (3) we add the number of kids as well as log income. Due to the design of the subsidies the number of children as well as household income has an effect on the subsidy ratio. 24 Intuitively people with more children have a higher subsidy ratio because their lump sum subsidy increases with every child. When it comes to income the complex combination of lump sum subsidy and tax return creates a u-shaped relationship between the overall subsidy ratio and income with the highest subsidy ratio for the lowest incomes. 25 To account for the nonlinearity we 24 The subsidy ratio is defined as the lump sum subsidies plus tax return divided by the sum of lump sum subsidies plus tax return plus own contributions.
25 See, e.g. Coppola and Reil-Held (2009 The most important result is that our initial findings from specification (1) remain almost unchanged. We find a significant influence of subjective absolute life expectancy for our female respondents when we add more covariates. The marginal effects become even stronger. That means our hypothesis is not rejected in any of our models. Women seem to select Riester pensions depending on SLE. For men the story is somewhat different. Subjective life expectancy remains insignificant in all four models suggesting that men neither actively nor passively select themselves into Riester contracts depending on their subjective life expectancy.
The signs of the other covariates that show a significant effect reveal no surprises. For women the age effect remains unchanged. However, some caution is required when looking at specification (4). Here the effect of age is negative which means younger individuals in 2009 are less likely to hold a Riester contract. It is important to note that the negative sign is not in contrast to the results of the other three specifications, because in model (4) age represents a different effect because we do not look at panel data and therefore do not control for birth year simultaneously. Income and the number of children show the same significant sign for women an men. Earning more as well as having more children significantly increases the likelihood of owning a Riester contract. In the third model we do not detect a significant effect for financial or health risk. Furthermore, for women there is a significant effect of marital status in model (2) and (3) as well as an effect of the more explicit subsidy ratios in model (4).
In sum, we find some evidence of a small active selection on the basis of subjective life expectancy for women, but no effect for men. Women expecting to live one year longer are more likely to own a Riester pensions. However, compared to the effect of the subsidies (as proxied by the number of children, and marital status in model 2 and 3 and explicitly calculated in model 4) the effects seems to be relatively small. 26 The dummies financial risk and health risk take on the value one for individuals not willing to take any risk.
Life-Tables and Mark Ups
Finally, we would like to compare the selection detected on the demand side to the markups charged from the supply side. This is a highly policy relevant question, because private pension insurers have been accused of charging mark-ups that are too high and thereby discourage investments in private pension contracts. However, before we can compare our findings to the present market premiums in life expectancy we want to look at the underlying life tables in more detail. Therefore, in the next section we compare the statistical life tables used by the federal statistic office of Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt) and the life-tables calculated by the German actuary society (Deutsche Aktuarvereinigung-DAV) for the insured population.
Life Tables
When comparing so called "real" mark ups on the Riester market we need a life table that represents the insured and one that represents the uninsured population. First we have to choose whether we want to apply period or cohort life tables. Period life tables represent a cross section of mortality rates while the latter incorporates a declining mortality trend in the future. Because we know that mortality rates have been declining since the start of empirical statistics for Germany in 1871 and are likely to decline in the future, it seems more appropriate to compare the cohort life tables for our two populations. Unfortunately the German statistics association (Statistisches Bundesamt) only provides us with a cohort life table that represents the population as a whole rather than the population without an annuity contract alone. Bearing that in mind, we know that the underlying mark up only represents the difference between the insured population and the population as a whole and therefore will be smaller than the full selection effect between those with and without an annuity contract. More precisely, we will look at the last cohort life table issued in 2004 by the Statistische Bundesamt. The calculation comprises two underlying trend scenarios named V1 and V2. V1 looks at the mortality trends since 1871 while the latter places extra weight on the short term trend since 1970.
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Because mortality rates experienced a stronger decline in the short run, life expectancies are always higher in V2 compared to V1. For our analysis we will focus on the short term scenario V2 because first, it seems more appropriate to forecast the mortality rates in the future based on values since 1970 compared to 1871 and second, we want to avoid overestimating the selection effect by underestimating the life expectancy of our reference group. (2005)). The DAV is the professional representative of insurance and financial actuaries in Germany. The DAV estimates cohort life tables of a so called "first" and "second" order based on their own data and certain assumptions. These life tables aim to be representative for the individuals engaged in the annuity market.
The second order represents the life table that incorporates only the selection effect in life expectancy on the annuity market whereas the first order is the life table actually applied by the industry. The latter also takes additional risk parameters, like volatility or simply misapprehension, into account. The first order table with all its additional mark ups is justified by the fact that a private firm needs to make a financially sustainable calculation that assures the solvency of the company in the future.
28 For the purpose of our comparison we will use the second order cohort life table as our benchmark, because it represents the mark up that is solely justified by the underlying selection effect. In order not to overestimate the statistical selection effect we will use the most pessimistic version of the second order table with respect to the underlying trend moderation, meaning the trend that predicts the lowest life expectancies. The graphs below compare the resulting life expectancies in the year 2009 from the Statistische Bundesamt and the DAV for our age window from 26 to 60 for men and women.
[ Figure 3 and 4 about here]
Overall we see substantial differences between the statistical values for the two populations that varies to a small extent with age due to a slightly different shape of the two graphs. The next chapter answers the question how those differences compare to the mark ups that can be detected in the micro-data.
Mark-Ups
When comparing the mark ups in subjective life expectancy and statistical life expectancy we focus on 6 age groups as shown in table 7. The table shows the mark ups we observe in the SAVE data (subjective mark ups) as well as the statistical mark ups separately for women and men.
[ Table 7 about here]
28 Because there is empirical evidence that the short term trend in mortality will mitigate in the future, see DAV (2005)(p. 112ff), the second order includes different moderation scenarios that differ in moderation timing and speed. However, the first order does not include such moderation because it views the possibility that the underlying moderation will turn out to be wrong as specific risk factor.
We want to focus on the subsidised Riester market. Before we can compare the subjective and statistical mark ups we have to discuss the effects of unisex tariffs. Due to a statistically higher life expectancy of women compared to men as well as the construction of a standard Riester annuity contract that matures at the policyholder's death, the average contract of a woman induces a longer pay-out phase or in other words higher costs for the provider. Consequently, if by law the differentiation by gender is taken away an insurance company has to make an assumption about the composition of its clients regarding their sex. The higher the share of women that are expected to buy a Riester contract the higher the implicit life expectancy upon which a provider bases the calculation. Looking at a broad range of companies that provide information about their underlying gender decomposition we can detect a lower and upper limit regarding the weight that is put on male and female life expectancy. Each decomposition leads to a corresponding unisex life expectancy. In this case the lower limit implies decomposition into 60% women and 40% men, whereas the upper limit translates into 80% women and only 20% men.
29 In a next step these artificial unisex life expectancies can be compared to the corresponding life expectancies for men and women that are found in the cohort life table from the Statistische Bundesamt. In table 7 the resulting mark ups for the lower and upper limit scenario are shown in the rows "Riester I" and "Riester II" and the subjective SAVE differences between those with a Riester contract and those without any annuity contract are shown in the row "Difference: Riester -no Annuity". In order to be able to assess the effect of unisex tariffs the row "Statistic Cohort Life Tables" shows the mark ups that would result in a world were gender discrimination is still permitted.
In table 7 we can see that in a world of gender specific contracts the mark ups for men and women are fairly similar and lie between 3 and 4 years. Second, the difference in the sex decomposition of the lower and upper limit translates into an increase in the statistical mark up by about one year. Third, the fact that the companies need to offer unisex tariffs decreases the mark ups for women but at the same time increases the mark ups for men relative to scenario with separate male and female DAV life tables. It is important to note, that in absolute terms the increase for men doesn't correspond to the decrease for women because this would only be the case for an underlying decomposition of 50% male and 50% female contract holders. However, the fact that even the lower limit scenario implies a greater share of women always results in the stronger increase for men relative to the decrease for women.
Comparing the subjective mark ups and the statistical mark ups reveals a very different picture for men and women. While for women on average the subjective mark up for men the picture is very mixed. More interestingly when we compare the mark ups in the SAVE data to the mark ups charged by the industry there seems to be a fairly good match for women. The observed selection effect based on SLE of around 1 to 2 years, corresponds to the loading charge by the industry. However, if we look at the male population we get very different results. Not only can we see overall lower subjective differences between the individuals with and without a Riester contract (the results in the previous section were not significant), but more importantly the statistical mark ups are very high due to the unisex regulation. Loading charges for men range between 6 and 8 years.
Overall, unisex tariffs create a huge disparity between the mark ups for women and men and this can be expected to have an effect on the selection process on the Riester market. For women the mark ups are relatively modest and are reflected fairly well in the difference in subjective life expectancy. In other words for women we observe a match between actuarial assumptions and individual expectation. However, for men the mark ups are disproportionately high and do not reflected peoples' expectations. This might explain that for men subjective life expectancy does not seem to play a role in the selection process Men are generally prevented from buying Riester contracts based on subjective life expectancies due to the high loading charges. Based on a crude calculation regarding the relationship between the MWR and the subsidy rate it would take an additional annual subsidy of around 17% for an average man to be on par with the average woman in terms of the expected MWR. Men's Riester ownership is driven by socio-demographic characteristics but not by subjective life expectancy.
Robustness Checks
One important aspect of the SAVE study is that it is a household based questionnaire where only one person of the household is interviewed. The questions regarding old age provisions relate to the situation of the household as a whole, meaning that in some cases it is not possible to directly link a Riester contract to a specific person. As an example we can pick a married couple who live together and hold one Riester contract. In this case we do not know which spouse owns the contract and therefore we might assign the subjective life expectancy of the respondent to that one contract when in reality his or her spouse is the actual owner of the Riester contract.
However, in a larger number of cases we do know if it is the respondent that owns the contract. The obvious cases are single households where the respondent is the only adult in the house and therefore we can directly link any annuity contract. In a second case when we look at couples that own more than one Riester contract we can assume that the person answering the questionnaire directly owns one of the contracts. 30 Apart from these two circumstances there is a third combination of answers from which we can directly link a Riester contract to the respondent. If there is only one Riester contract and no private old age provision contract in a non-single household we can exploit a question that asks for the expected old age income sources separately for both partners.
One sub-item contains private old age provisions including Riester contracts. The reason we do not use this question directly is that it covers both, subsidized and unsubsidized, old age provisions. In our case we know that out of the broader category there is only one Riester contract in the household, therefore if the respondent answers that he or she will expect income out of that category but his or her partner will not we can link the Riester contract to the respondent.
Based on this approach, we compare our newly derived smaller group of directly linked contract holders with our initial group of Riester annuity savers. Table 8 shows the resulting subjective life expectancies of our two initial groups from table 4 plus the newly derived expectancies of Riester savers where a direct link was possible. Our initial results remain unchanged when using the reduced sample. For women, conditional on age, we find a significant positive effect of subjective life expectancy on the likelihood of owning a Riester pension, for men we still do not find a significant effect of subjective life expectancy on Riester ownership.
Conclusions
We have three central findings. First, men as well as women are pessimistic about their life expectancy. Women (men) underestimate their life span by about 7 (6.5) years compared to the official records by the German statistical office. Second in line with our hypothesis we find a small selection effect in the German market for Riester annuities based on women' subjective life expectancy. This selection effect is present not only when controlling solely for age, as the only variable that the provider can use to set the price for a Riester contract, but also when controlling for additional covariates that potentially influence annuity choice and subjective life expectancy at the same time.
Women holding a Riester contract expect to live longer compared to women without an annuity contract. However, in contrast to our hypothesis we do not find a selection effect 30 In very rare cases there might be children eligible for Riester annuities that also live in the household. In these cases if the number of contracts is smaller than the amount of eligible household members we again have an assignment problem. For our analysis we will disregard these cases.
for men on the Riester market based on their subjective life expectancy. At first glance our findings appear counterintuitive considering the design of the Riester contracts. Women benefit from subsidies as well as unisex life tables which generally make the contracts attractive, even for women with lower life expectancies. Men only benefit from the subsidies but suffer from the unisex regulation. As a result the difference in subjective life expectancy between Riester savers and individuals without an annuity contract should be more pronounced for men.
The third important finding concerns the loading charge of the insurance industry compared to the selection effect based on subjective life expectancy. For women the subjective mark up ranges between 1 and 2 years and is approximately in line with the loading charge by the industry. However, due to the special unisex regulation on the Riester market mark ups are very high for men (up to 8 years) and do not correspond to the subjective mark ups for men. Men do not select themselves into Riester contracts based on SLE but rather due to other socio-demographic characteristics. The gender gap in mark ups gives us a possible explanation for the results regarding our hypotheses. The mark ups for men might simply be high enough to prevent a selection process according to subjective life expectancy. For men other factors seem to determine whether to invest into the Riester scheme.
The overall judgment of whether the mark up of the insurance industry is justified based on adverse selection remains complex because we can only compare the statistic adjustments by the DAV with subjective estimations of our sample. If the SAVE participants systematically make errors regarding their subjective life expectancy their real mortality risk could still match the assumptions by the insurance companies. However, because people base their decision making process on subjective assumptions the fact that they think the mark up is too high can already cause negative consequences, namely that a large share of the population will be underinvested in private annuity contracts. Informing individuals about their longevity risk might improve individual's risk assessment and ultimately lead to better coverage. (Rubin 1987 (Rubin , 1996 ). Specifications (Rubin 1987 (Rubin , 1996 ). Specifications This table reports the subjective and statistical mark ups in the market for Riester contracts by age classes. The first row report the subjective life expectancy of the population without any annuity contract, the second row of those owning a Riester pension. The subjective mark ups are calculated as the difference between these two groups. The statistical mark ups are calculated as the difference between the life expectancies of the Statistische Bundesamt for the whole population and the life expectancies according to the estimations of the German Actuary Society (DAV). The first row reports the mark ups in the case where gender discrimination can be applied, the second and third row report the mark up for unisex contracts using a different composition and therefore applying a weighting factor for male and female life expectancies. 
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